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RECENT DECISIONS
Eminent Domain-The Effect of a Revocable License on the
Determination of Compensation-The United States started pro-
ceedings under the Second War Powers Act' to condemn land which
the appellees owned in fee, land leased from the State of New Mexico,
and the public domain on which the appellees held grazing permits.
The district court permitted the ranchers to introduce evidence of the
carrying capacity of the ranches considering the land owned in fee and
the permit lands as an economic unit. The United States appealed from
this ruling. Held: Judgment reversed. The grazing permits were can-
celed coincidentally with the taking and it was error to consider the
availability of the permit land in assessing the value of the free land
taken. United States v. Cox, 190 F. 2d 293 (1951).
In a companion case decided on the same day, with the same facts
except that the fee land alone was taken and the public domain was
not, it was held that the permits were outstanding at the time of the
taking and it was proper to consider the availability of the permit
land in valuing the fee land taken. United States v. Jaramillo, 190
F.2d 300 (1951).
In both cases under consideration the ranchers owned small pieces
of land which in themselves had a little value but on which they had
developed water holes which were very valuable when considered in
connection with the accessibility of the adjoining public domain. The
grazing permits held by the ranchers were issued by the Secretary
of the Interior under the Taylor Grazing Act 2 which authorized him
to create grazing districts and issue ten-year permits to ranchers who
were able to make the best use of the land. It was expressly provided
that no property interest was created by the Act 3 and the Secretary
of the Interior was authorized to reclassify these lands and open them
for any other use whenever he determined that they were more
valuable for such use.4 Thus in Osborne v. United States5 these per-
mits were declared to be mere revocable licenses. Therefore, two
issues are presented by the principal cases: firstly, when either the
private land alone is taken, or both the public and the private lands
are taken, should the availability of the public domain be considered
an element of value of the private land; and secondly, can a value
be placed on the availability of the public domain since the permits
were merely revocable licenses.
The right to compensation when property is taken by the United
150 U.S.C.A. §171a (1948).
243 U.S.C.A. §315-315r (1948).
3 43 U.S.C.A. §315b (1948).443 U.S.C.A. §315f (1948).
5145 F. 2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
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States under its eminent domain power is secured by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution.6 The general rules developed in interpreting
this provision are: that compensation must be paid for any kind of
right or interest in land taken which has a market value, that the
payment must be certain and reasonably prompt, and that the method
by which the amount is determined and the payment is made must
adequately protect the interests of the property owner.7 Of course,
to be adequately compensated the owner must receive the fair market
value of the property, and in determining this value it is proper to
consider all the elements which an ordinarily prudent buyer would
take into account." Thus it is necessary to consider all the possible
uses to which the land could be put and to base compensation on the
most advantageous use,10 and a use need not be excluded from con-
sideration although its adaptability depends upon the continuance of
extrinsic condition over which the landover has no control.11 It is
sufficient if the use is so probable and practical as to affect market
value.12 As a further result of the necessity for just compensation,
the value of the property must be fixed as of the time of the taking
and the effect of the taking on the value, due to a change in the nature
of surrounding property etc., cannot be considered.' 3
The most valuable use rule forms the basis of the rancher's con-
tention for valuing his ranch together with the permit land as an
economic unit in each of the cases under review. When merely the
fee land of the rancher is taken, his permit is not affected since the
public domain is still classified within a grazing district and is avail-
able for grazing at the time of the taking. Therefore, the rule requires
that the effect of the permit on the fair market value be determined.
This was the reasoning used by Circuit Judge Murray in the Jaramillo
Case and no dissents were taken therefrom.
On the other hand when both the fee land of the rancher and the
permit land are taken in the same proceedings, a question arises as
to the effect of the taking of the permit land on the permit. In such
case it is necessary to look to the statute creating the permit. If by
the terms of the statute only a common law revocation is necessary,
the permit would be revoked by the taking of the permit land under
the common law rule that a revocable license is revoked by an act of
the licensor inconsistent with the maintenance of the license.' 4 Of
". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5.
7 29 C.J.S. EMINENT DomAIN §§99-104.
8 18 AM. JuR. EMINENT DOMAIN §242.
929 C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN §273.
10 18 Amf. Jup. EMINENT DOMAIN §244.
11 City of Tilsa v. Creekmore, 167 Old. 298, 29 P. 2nd 101 (1934).
12 Ibid.
23 Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F. 2d 884, 891 (6th Cir. 1937).
14THoMPsoN ON REAL PROPERTY §651 (1924).
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course if the permit is revoked, it is not possible to consider the use
of the permit land in valuing the fee land of the rancher. This is the
view Judge Murray takes in the majority opinion of the Cox Case.' 5
But if the statute prescribes a procedure which must be followed
to revoke the license and that procedure is not complied with, a
mere common law revocation would not be sufficient to cancel the
license, and it would be outstanding at the time of the taking. In
such case the rule of most valuable use must be applied and although
the permit would be rendered useless by the taking of the permit
land, its value to the fee land must be considered because the value
must be fixed as of the time of taking and the effect of the taking
on the value cannot be considered. This is the reasoning applied by
Chief Judge Phillips in the dissent in the Cox Case.16
It can be seen therefore, that the difference in the two views ex-
pressed in the Cox Case is basically due to the different interpretations
taken of the Taylor Grazing Act as a premise of each opinion. Under
section (f) of this Act' the Secretary of the Interior is required to
give reasonable notice to permit holders in order to open the lands
in a grazing district to any other use. Here the lands were taken
for military purposes at the request of the War Department. Under
section (q)'18 when the public domain is taken for war purposes the
head of the department so taking "shall" pay the ranchers a fair com-
pensation for losses suffered but no procedure is set up to revoke
the permits, nor elsewhere in the act is any provision for revocation
made. Thus the only requirement laid down by the statute is when
the grazing land is opened for other uses. In the Osborne Case9 the
situation was identical with that presented in the Cox Case except that
the Secretary of the Interior revoked the permits before the con-
demnation proceedings were started. This would be the proper pro-
cedure if a statutory revocation was necessary, but condemnation for
15 "But in our view, there can be no legally significant difference in the with-
drawal of the permits for war purposes by the Secretary of the Interior,
as in the Osborne Case, and the cancellation of the permits by a declaration
of taking in condemnation proceedings."
"But, it (evidence of the value of the permit lands to the ranch) is not
competent unless the permit lands are available and accessible for that
purpose and they cannot be said to be available and accessible here, since the
permits were withdrawn or canceled coincidental with the taking."
16 "At the time of the taking and at the time of the trial below the public lands
had not been withdrawn from the grazing district by the Secretary of the
Interior and the permits had not been revoked, but were in full force and
effect." "But, it does seem to me that to the extent public lands adjacent to
the privately owned lands available on the date of the taking for use in
connection therewith increased the value of the privately-owned lands and
water rights, such increased value was a proper item to be taken into consid-
eration in determining the value of the privately-owned lands."
1743 U.S.C.A. §315f (1948).
1843 U.S.C.A. §315q (1948).
19 Supra note 5.
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war purposes probably would not come within "opening for any other
use" under section (f) 2 0 since that section is entitled "Homestead
entry within district or withdrawn lands" and since use for war pur-
poses specially comes within section (q) .21 Furthermore a statutory
provision will not be presumed to repeal the common law unless the
language naturally or necessarily leads to that conclusion.22 Therefore
a common law revocation is probably all that is necessary. Thus the
majority opinion seems better law and the procedure followed in the
Osborne Case was probably superfluous.
The rule derived from Judge Murray's opinions in the two cases
presented here is that when merely the fee land of the permit holder
is taken, the availability of the permit land must be considered an
element of value thereof, but if both lands are taken the additional
value due to the permit can't be considered.
The question remains what vMue can be placed on the availability
of the permit land when the fee land alone is condemned, since the
permits created no property interest and were revocable at will. Of
course, no compensation is required for the loss of the license itself.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires compensation only
for the loss of property interests, and the existence of value alone
doesn't generate an interest protected by this Amendment. 23 Thus it
has been held that a revocable license is not a property interest
recognized by the Constitution and if the permit land alone were
taken no compensation would be required for the loss of the permit.2 4
However, when the land of the permit holder is taken, the fair
market value test 25 requires that the effect of an outstanding permit
on the market value of the land be determined. In doing so the jury
need not apply any mathematical formulas but must determine a
recovery which is reasonable in light of all the relevant facts intro-
duced.21 In order to recover damages evidence of their existence and
extent, or data from which they may be computed, must be intro-
duced.2 7 However, the degree of certainty which must be established
depends on the nature of the case, and a proximate estimation of
witnesses may be sufficient.2 8
In fixing compensation it is always necessary to consider the
environment in which the property is situated. Thus in valuing urban
2oSupra note 17.21Supra note 18.
2215 C.J.S. CoMMoN LAW §20.
2 Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U. S. 315, 53 S. Ct. 177, 77 L. Ed. 331, 83 A.L.R.
1429 (1932).24Clapp v. Boston, 133 Mass. 367 (1882) ; United States v. Honolulu Plantation
Co., 182 F. 2d 172 (9th Cir. 1950).2 5 Supra note 8.
2625 C.J.S. DAMAGES §88.
2725 C.J.S. DAMAGES §28.
2825 C.J.S. DAMAGES §26 (c).
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real estate there are many factors such as schools, roads, parks, and
surrounding property which may be properly considered although
there is no right in the property owner to have them maintained in
the condition then prevalent. Therefore, if evidence is introduced
that the availability of the permit land would effect market value, the
increase in value due to the permit must be determined. Thus in the
Jaramillo Case the trial court instructed the jury that it should give
to the fee land such additional value due to the availability of the
permit land as it thought necessary to be given. However, witnesses
for the ranchers were permitted to separately value the permit land
and add this to the value of the fee land. Because of this, the judg-
ment was reversed, it being improper to separately appraise the
different elements constituting the whole.29 However, the court held
that the instructions given were proper and directed the trial court
to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion,
that is, to consider the availability of the permit land as an element of
value of the fee land provided that consideration be also given to
the fact that the permits could be withdrawn at any time without
obligation to compensate therefor.
Thus back in the district court Jaramillo will have to show the
value of the land as an economic unit. This could be done by showing
the carrying capacity of the ranch with the permit land and multi-
plying this figure by a peranimal unit value and then adding the
estimated value of the improvements. This was the method used in
the Cox Case. Then to show how much of this value he could get
in the open market because of the revocability of the permits he would
have to produce witnesses who could estimate the effect of the avail-
ability of the permit land on the value of the fee land in the open
market. Apparently the permits were usually not revoked and were
considered valuable in the open market because the dissenting opinion
in the Cox Case points out that the availability of permit lands had
been taken into consideration by buyers and sellers in that region for
many years.
Thus while these two cases did not place a value on the effect of a
revocable license on the land benefited thereby, the ruling in the
Jaramillo Case laid the groundwork for future cases doing so.
JOHN GROGAN
Evidence-When Is Fact of Prior Criminal Offense Admissible
to Show Common Scheme-Defendants, members and employees of
Union Local No. 65, were charged with obstructing an officer who
29 United States v. Meyer, 113 F. 2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1940).
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